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ALL ALMOST QUIET ON THE EXPANDED
REVIEW FRONT: SUPREME COURT REJECTS

EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
ARBITRATION AWARDS
Since ancient Greece, arbitration has developed into an attractive,
cost efficient and timely alternative to litigation.' The United States
Congress codified the Federal Arbitration Act (the "Act") in 1925 to help
facilitate the recognition and growth of arbitration in the United States.2 To
maintain the private nature of arbitration and ensure out-of-court resolution
of most disputes, the drafters of the Act created four narrow grounds for
judicial review of an arbitrator's award: (1) arbitrator corruption, fraud or
undo means; (2) evident partiality; (3) misconduct or misbehavior; and (4)
[an] award in excess of tribunal power (hereinafter the "§ 10 Grounds").3
I See Sabra A. Jones, Historical, Development of Commercial Arbitration in the United
States, 12 MINN. L. REv. 240, 242-51 (1928) (chronicling development of arbitration from
ancient Greek and Roman times); Paul J. Krause, DisregardingManifest Disregard. Watts Shifts
Standardjbr Vacating Arbitrators' Decisions, 72 DEF. COUNS. J. 79, 79 (2005) (citing "speed,
economy, finality, confidentiality, flexibility, arbitrator expertise, and neutrality of forum" as
advantages of arbitration over traditional litigation); Ilya Enkishev, Comment, Above the Law:
Practicaland PhilosophicalImplications of Contractingfor Expanded JudicialReview, 3 J. AM.
ARB. 61, 65-65 & nn.16-17 (2004) (providing brief synopsis on history of arbitration).
2 See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000) (codifying federal arbitration law);
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (citing Dean Witter Reynolds
Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 & n.6 (1985)) (describing purpose of Act to "revers[e] ...
judicial hostility" to arbitration and put arbitration "[upon] the same footing as other contracts.").
United States arbitration policy also aspires to facilitate arbitration as the preferred dispute
resolution mechanism between international parties. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985) (noting emphatic United States public policy
preference in favor of arbitration in international trade). This preference for arbitration arguably
coincides with the international movement towards "A-national arbitration" which allows
international business parties to avoid parochial national court systems through arbitration. See
Thomas E. Carbonneau, Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration, 28-29 (Thomas E. Carbonneau, ed.,
1998) (describing movement toward "A-national" arbitration). In this way, business parties can
assess costs and risks at the outset of a transaction by ensuring that their reasonable expectations
will be met in an arbitral tribunal that settles disputes without regard to domestic whimsy or
national public policies. Id. Ideally, national courts called upon to enforce such awards avoid
substantive considerations of the underlying dispute and assess only the validity of parties'
agreements to arbitrate and the procedural fairness of the tribunal. Id.; see Celia Wasserstein
Fassberg, Lex Mercatoria--Hoist with Its Own Petard?, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 67, 74 (2004)
(discussing courts' modern treatment of international arbitration awards).
3 See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000). Section 10(a) of the statute states that a
court may vacate an arbitrator's award where:
(1) ...the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2)... there was
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For the last thirteen years, a circuit battle raged over party driven expansion
of judicial review beyond the § 10 Grounds (hereinafter referred to as
"Expanded Review"). 4 This term, the Supreme Court resolved this split in
Hall Street Associates v. Mattel,5 holding that Expanded Review could not
co-exist with the Act.6
The Hall Street Court resolved the circuit split and many pivotal
questions relating to the Expanded Review doctrine.' First, the opinion
resolved a jurisdictional squabble that both those in favor of Expanded
Review (hereinafter "Pro-Expansion" circuits or commentators and "ProExpansionists") and those arguing against the doctrine (hereinafter "AntiExpansion" circuits or commentators and "Anti-Expansionists") struggled
with.' Next, the Hall Street Court eliminated the "manifest disregard" non-9
statutory standard of review that had also inspired considerable debate.

evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators ...;(3) ...the arbitrators were guilty
of misconduct ... by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4)... the
arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final,
and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
Id.Section II of the Act provides grounds for modification or correction of an award. 9 U.S.C.
§ 11 (2000).
4 Compare Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir. 2005)
(allowing parties to explicitly contract for Expanded Review beyond the § 10 Grounds), and
Jacada (Europa) Ltd. v. Int'l Mktg. Strategies, Inc. 401 F.3d 701, 710 (6th Cir. 2005) (supporting
Expanded Review), and Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 2001)
(noting parties' ability to replace Act § 10 "off-the-rack" standards with their own), and Syncor
Int'l Corp. v. McLeland, No. 96-2261, 1997 U.S. App. WL 452245, at *6 (4th Cir. Aug. 11,
1997) (unpublished table decision) (holding "award may be vacated or corrected by judicial
review... " for errors of law), and Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993,
997 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding parties may displace the § 10 Grounds), with Kyocera Corp. v.
Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 1000 (9th Cir. 2003) (en bane) (holding
against Expanded Review), and Schoch v. InfoUSA, Inc., 341 F.3d 785, 789 & n.3 (8th Cir.
2003) (expressing reservations about permissibility of Expanded Review), and Bowen v. Amoco
Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 936 (10th Cir. 2001) (observing no authority for parties to dictate
terms to federal courts), and Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc.,
935 F.2d 1501, 1505 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating parties cannot create federal jurisdiction by
contracting for Expanded Review).
5 128 S.Ct. 1396 (2008). Please note that as this article was going to press the Hall Street v.
Mattel decision was published in the Supreme Court Reporter. Because of this timing the
citations for the case in this article still refer to the Westlaw TM citation: 2008 WL 762537 (U.S.
2008).
6 See id.
at *4 (holding against Expanded Review).
7 See infra Part III (analyzing Hall Street opinion).
8 See Hall Street v. Mattel, 2008 WL 762537, at *4 (U.S. 2008) (explaining Act does not
bestow federal jurisdiction).
9 Id; see Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953) (overruled on other grounds) (noting
an arbitrator's "manifest disregard" of law governing arbitration agreement may be grounds for
vacating award). Each circuit has developed some derivation of "manifest disregard" review.
Christopher R. Drahozal, Codifing Manifest Disregard,8 NEV L.J. 234, 234 (2007). But see
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Third, the Court confronted the Pro-Expansionist central contractualist
argument by utilizing a textual and historical interpretation of the Act's
grounds for confirmation and review of an arbitration decision.10 Fourth,
the Court emphatically held that unlike some Pro-Expansionists'
suggestions, the § 10 Grounds for review and the § 11 standards for
modification or correction are exclusive." The opinion then bolstered its
2
analysis with some key policy arguments against Expanded Review.'
Finally, though the Court held that Expanded Review would no longer be
permitted in federal courts applying the Act, the Court left open the
possibility that parties could obtain Expanded Review in different
settings. 13
This note will argue that the Hall Street decision successfully
resolved the circuit split and many of the questions regarding Expanded
Review. Part I will discuss a brief history of the Act, chronicle the circuit
split on Expanded Review, and list a few commentator suggestions that
may still be of use after Hall Street. Part I will consider the Hall Street
decision. Part III will analyze the opinion, focusing on how it (1) answered
key questions relating to Expanded Review; (2) dismantled the ProExpansionist arguments; (3) missed a few crucial policy arguments
suggesting against the doctrine; and (4) potentially confused the status of
Expanded Review in non Act forums. Part III.F. will scrutinize the
reservations the Court expressed about its holding. Part IV urges states to
eradicate Expanded Review but offers three solutions for parties who still
desire more searching review in the wake of Hall Street.
I. HISTORY
A. The Act and JudicialReview
An examination of § 10 of the Act and its underlying rationale
Kenneth Curtin, An Examination of ContractualExpansion and Limitation of JudicialReview of
Arbitral Awards, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 337, 351 (2000) (dismissing "manifest
disregard" standard as "little more than a historical oddity that is rarely, if ever, successfully
asserted."); Lee Goldman, Contractually Expanded Review of Arbitration Awards, 8 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 171, 172 (2003) (observing non-statutory grounds like "manifest disregard"
"have been interpreted very narrowly."); Enkishev, supra note 1, at 66-67 (arguing labor
arbitration exclusivity of non-statutory standards for review).
10 See Hall Street v. Mattel, 2008 WL 762537, at *6-*7 (U.S. 2008) (presenting textual and
historical arguments against Expanded Review).
1 Id. at *7 (concluding textual analysis).
12 See id. (listing policy arguments).
13 See id. at *4 (holding Expanded Review no longer permissible in federal courts applying
the Act). But see id. at *8 (outlining limitations to holding).
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helps foster an understanding of the issues implicated by Expanded
Review.' 4 In 1925, Congress adopted the Act to streamline arbitration,
eliminate traditional judicial hostility towards arbitration, and ensure the
enforceability of private agreements to arbitrate. 15 Act §§ 9-11 provides
the procedural mechanics by which parties can take an arbitration award to6
a court and confirm or attempt to vacate, correct, or modify that award.'
The Act § 10 provides exceptionally limited grounds for judicial review of
an arbitrator's decision. 17
B. Federal CircuitSplit on ExpandedReview
The First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits all held in favor

14

See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (citing Dean Witter

Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 & n.6 (1985)) (explaining Act designed to "reverse
judicial hostility" towards arbitration); Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 932 (10th
Cir. 2001) (arguing purpose of Act was to ensure limited and narrow review of arbitration
awards).
15 See supra note 2 and accompanying text (explaining Act's purpose).
"6 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-11 (2000) (providing Act mechanism for confirmation, vacatur,
modification, or correction of arbitration award). The Act § 9 provides that a court must confirm
an arbitration award presented it to unless the grounds for vacation (stipulated in § 10) or
modification or correction (presented in § 11) are present. 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-11 (2000); see
Enkishev, supra note 1,at 70 (analyzing text of the Act). Enkishev advocated a combined
reading of Act §§ 9 and 10 explaining that § 9 mandates "that a court 'must"' confirm an
arbitrator's award unless the award is vacated based on § 10. Id. Therefore, according to the
author, a court "must" confirm an award unless a court finds grounds for review based on § 10.
Id.
17 See supra text accompanying note 3 (noting relevant language from § 10 Grounds); see
also Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 998 (9th Cir. 2003) (en
banc) (reasoning § 10 Grounds "afford an extremely limited review authority, a limitation that is
designed to preserve due process but not to permit unnecessary public intrusion into private
arbitration procedures."); Bowen, 254 F.3d at 932 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting ARW Exploration
Corp v. Aguirre, 45 F.3d 1455, 1462 (10th Cir. 1995)) (explaining court's review of arbitration
decision "is among the narrowest known to the law"). This narrow review ensures "judicial
respect for" and finality of arbitration decisions. Id. at 935; see also Victoria L.C. Holstein,
Article, Co-Opting the FederalJudiciaty: Contractual Expansion of JudicialReview of Arbitral
Awards, 1 J. AM. ARB. 127, 130-31 (2002) (explaining Act "curtails judicial post award
intervention to a cursory review of whether the award was tainted by fraud, procedural infirmity,
partiality, or arbitrator misconduct during the arbitral proceedings."); Bradley T. King, Note,
"Through Fault of Their Own" - Applying Bonner Mall's ExtraordinaryCircumstances Test to
Heightened Standard of Review Clauses, 45 B.C. L. REv. 943, 955-56 (2004) (citing Ian R.
MacNeil et al., Federal Arbitration Law § 40.1.4 (Supp. 1999)) (observing drafters of Act
deliberately opted to exclude provisions allowing for judicial review for legal error). Professor
MacNeil argued that the American Bar Association (ABA) actually drafted the Act and that
Congress merely rubber stamped that draft. King, supra, at 955. Also, King suggests that the
ABA opted not to utilize two statutory templates existing at the time of drafting-the 1917
Illinois arbitration statute and the English Arbitration Act of 1889. King, supra, at 956. Both
provided for more expansive judicial review. King, supra, at 956.
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of Expanded Review.1" These Pro-Expansion circuits first grounded their
arguments in contractualist doctrine germinating from language found in
Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford
Junior University.19 This strain of reasoning maintained that parties'
agreements control the arbitration process (including the post-reward
judicial review). 2 0 Based on this party autonomy, the Pro-Expansion
circuits argued the § 10 Grounds are merely suggested templates readily
replaceable by parties.21
One Pro-Expansion commentator found yet
another grounds to sanction Expanded Review-since the Supreme Court
already endorsed the "manifest disregard" non-statutory standard, he
argued the § 10 Grounds are non-exclusive.2 2 Additionally, the First
Circuit questioned the Anti-Expansion concern that Expanded Review
improperly created federal jurisdiction.2 3 Finally, many of the pivotal ProExpansion cases involved choice-of-law clauses in which the circuits,
while holding in favor of Expanded Review, did not sanction the practice
when parties included merely generic versions of these clauses.24

18See

Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir. 2005)

(allowing parties to contract for Expanded Review with explicit language); Jacada (Europa) Ltd.
v. Int'l Mktg. Strategies, Inc. 401 F.3d 701, 710 (6th Cir. 2005) (supporting Expanded Review);
Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting parties' ability
to replace the Act's "off-the-rack" standards with their own); Syncor Int'l Corp. v. McLeland,
No. 96-2261, 1997 U.S. App. WL 452245, at *6 (4th Cir. Aug. 11, 1997) (unpublished table
decision) (concluding Expanded Review available to parties); Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI
Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding parties may replace Act review
standards with their own).
19 Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989);
see Gateway, 64 F.3d at 996 (noting arbitration as "creature of contract"). The Gateway court
quoted Volt to note that "it does not follow that the [Act] prevents the enforcement of agreements
to arbitrate under different rules than those set forth in the Act." Id. (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at
479).
20 Gateway, 64 F.3d at 997. The Gateway court demonstrated that not only is contractual
expansion of review permissible, but that "federal arbitration policy demands" that courts follow
parties express intentions. Id.
21 See id. at 996 (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 479) ( "Parties may ... specify by contract the
rules under which ... arbitration will be conducted."); Roadway, 257 F.3d at 293 ( "Parties may
opt out of the Act's off-the-rack vacatur standards and fashion their own ....
").
22 Goldman, supra note 9, at 183-84 (suggesting Supreme Court sanctioned non-statutory
standards by endorsing "manifest disregard").
23 See Puerto Rico Tel., 427 F.3d at 30-31 ("[I]t is well settled that federal courts have
jurisdiction over suits seeking to compel arbitration ...

only if the parties are ...

diverse ...

or

some separate grant ofjurisdiction applies.").
24 See id at 29-30 (holding generic choice-of-law clause not enough to activate Expanded
Review); Jacada (Europa) Ltd. v. Int'l Mktg. Strategies, Inc., 401 F.3d 701, 712 (6th Cir. 2005)
(finding choice-of-law clause insufficient to allow Expanded Review); Roadway Package Sys.,
Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 2001) (concluding choice-of-law by itself would not
allow parties to expand judicial review of arbitration awards). The PuertoRico Tel. court based
its analysis on Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995), a case also
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The Ninth and Tenth Circuits held against Expanded Review,
while the Seventh and Eighth Circuits expressed reservations about the
doctrine's viability. 25 These Anti-Expansion Circuits underpinned their
analysis with the following arguments: (1) the parties' contractual control
over arbitration ended at the point when the arbitral tribunal makes its
award; (2) Congress intended the Act to control federal law on arbitration,
not to suggest guidelines dismissible by contractual whim; and (3)
Expanded Review implicated several policy concerns relating to the
potential of morphing arbitration into adjudication.
The policy concerns
noted by the Anti-Expansion circuits were as follows, Expanded Review:
(1) sacrificed the "simplicity, expediency, and cost-effectiveness of
arbitration;" (2) undermined judicial respect for arbitration awards and the
finality of an arbitral tribunal's decision; (3) prevented arbitrators from
fashioning unique awards because of their fear of judicial scrutiny and
blue-pencil; and (4) forced federal trial courts to sit as appellate courts.27

dealing with a choice-of-law clause. Puerto Rico Tel., 427 F.3d at 27-29. The Mastrobuono
court concluded that parties could not inhibit the powers of an arbitrator though a generic choiceof-law clause. Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 63-64. Building from this premise, the Puerto Rico Tel.
court cited Mastrobuono to conclude that, "a choice-of-law [clause], standing alone, generally
will not be interpreted to require the application of state law restricting 'the authority of
arbitrators."' Puerto Rico Tel., 427 F.3d at 28 (citing Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. 52 at 63-64).
25 See Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 1000 (9th Cir.
2003) (en banc) (holding Act standards of review are exclusive); Schoch v. InfoUSA, Inc., 341
F.3d 785, 789 & n.3 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting policy concerns with Expanded Review); Bowen v.
Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 936 (10th Cir. 2001) (concluding no authority existed for
Expanded Review); Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d
1501, 1505 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating parties cannot create federal jurisdiction by contracting for
Expanded Review).
26 See Hoeft v. MVL Group, 343 F.3d 57, 66 (2d Cir. 2003) ( "Judicial review is not a
creature of contract, and the authority of a federal court to review an arbitration award ... does
not derive from a private agreement."); Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 1000 (explaining when federal court
receives dispute, parties' control over arbitration process ends); Bowen, 254 F.3d at 932 (noting
purpose of the Act was to ensure limited and narrow review of arbitration awards). The Bowen
court furthered that the Act's "limited review ensures judicial respect for the arbitration process
and prevents courts from enforcing parties' agreements to arbitrate only to refuse to respect the
results of the arbitration." Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935. The Kyocera court noted Congress passed
the Act "to trade the greater certainty of correct legal decisions by federal courts for the speed and
flexibility of arbitration determinations .... Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 998; see Schoch, 341 F.3d at
789 & n.3 (enumerating various policy concerns inherent to Expanded Review).
27 See Bowen, 254 F.3d at 936 n.7 (listing concerns about Expanded Review's effect on
"simplicity, expediency, and cost-effectiveness of arbitration"); King, supra note 17, at 984-86
(noting importance of finality to arbitration). The Bowen court also cautioned that arbitrators are
usually chosen for their particular knowledge and expertise in a given area and that Expanded
Review would make them reluctant to create solutions tailored to resolve a particular dispute.
Bowen, 254 F.3d at 936. Further, the Bowen court argued Expanded Review would force
arbitrators to write more detailed opinions, slowing down the dispute resolution process. Id.; see
Schoch, 341 F.3d at 785 & n.3 (warning Expanded Review "forc[ed] federal trial courts to sit as
appellate courts"). Similarly, the Kyocera court felt Expanded Review transformed arbitration
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Finally, the Seventh Circuit warned that Expanded Review impermissibly
28
created federal jurisdiction.
C. Two Useful Commentator Suggestions
Two commentators writing prior to Hall Street presented solutions
that may work within the strictures of the Act (and its fresh interpretation)
to allow parties varying degrees of more searching review. 29 Ilya Enkishev
endorses Judge Posner's solution that an appellate arbitration panel
("Appellate Arbitration Solution") allows parties additional review while
maintaining the limited role of the judiciary in arbitration and avoiding
running afoul of the Act. 30 Kristen Blankley argues that parties should
explicitly spell out the controlling law and procedures for an arbitration
proceeding, then if the arbitrator grievously misapplies this groundwork,
the reviewing court can offer relief under the "exceeding powers" provision
in § 10(a)(4) of the Act ("End Around Solution").3'
II. FACTS
The Supreme Court took up the issue of Expanded Review when it
granted certiorari in Hall Street Associates v. Mattel.32 This case involved

a dispute between a landlord (Hall Street) and a tenant (Mattel) over an
environmental indemnification provision in the parties' lease.

After

into "a prelude to a more cumbersome and time-consuming judicial review process." Kyocera,
341 F.3d at 998. The Bowen court furthered Expanded Review also "weaken[ed] the distinction
between arbitration and adjudication." Bowen, 254 F.3d at 936.
28 Chicago Typographical Union, 935 F.2d at 1504-05. The author of the opinion, Judge
Richard A. Posner, also advocated that "if parties want, they can contract for an appellate
arbitration panel to review the arbitrator's award." Id at 1505.
29 See infra text accompanying notes 30-31 (presenting solutions allowing for more
searching review).
30 See Enkishev, supra note 1, at 100-01 (citing Chicago, 935 F.2d at 1505 (7th Cir. 1991))
(presenting author's solution).
31 See Kristen M. Blankley, Be More Specific! Can Writing a Detailed Arbitration
Agreement Expand Judicial Review Under the FederalArbitration Act?, 2 SETON HALL CIRCUIT
REv. 391, 430 (2006) (describing mechanics of author's solution). The governing rules that the
arbitrator is obliged to follow would be explicitly provided for in the agreement. Id. If the
arbitrator grossly distorts these rules, the reviewing court can overturn the decision and still be
operating inside the framework of the Act. Id. at 430-43 1. While the author also envisioned
more thorough review via the judicially crafted "manifest disregard" framework, given the Hall
Street Court's pronouncement on that standard, this prong of her approach is likely no longer
effective. Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, 2008 WL 762537, at *5 (U.S. 2008).
32 2008 WL 762537, at *5.

33 Id. at *2. The parties' lease stipulated that the tenant would indemnify the landlord for any
costs stemming from a failure to follow environmental laws. Id. Tests of the property's well
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Mattel gave notice of their intent to terminate the lease in 2001, Hall Street
commenced suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Oregon.34 The district court then granted leave for the parties to arbitrate
the indemnification issue and the parties agreed on an arbitration clause
with Expanded Review for errors of law or fact. 35 After the arbitrator
decided for Mattel, Hall Street sought to vacate the award in district court
pursuant to § 10 of the Act and the parties' Expanded Review clause.36
The district court utilized the Expanded Review clause, vacated the award
based on the arbitrator's misapplication of the law, and remanded the case
to the arbitrator. 37 Pursuant to the district court's instructions, the arbitrator
reversed and found in favor of Hall Street. 38 After district court
confirmation of this award, both parties appealed to the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 39 The Ninth Circuit held that the Expanded
Review clause was unenforceable, reversed in Mattel's favor, and
remanded the case.40 After the district court again ruled for Hall Street and
the circuit court again reversed, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.4 '
At the outset of its discussion, the Court recited the purpose behind
the Act's adoption and resolved a jurisdictional dispute relating to the
Act.42 As a starting point, the Court explained that Congress passed the
Act to reverse then-existing judicial hostility to arbitration and to give
arbitration agreements the same treatment that other contracts received.43
water showed high levels of pollution, allegedly the product of discharges from Mattel's
predecessor in interest. Id. Mattel signed a consent order with local officials agreeing to clean up
the site. Id.
14 Id. at *3.
35 Id. The clause stated the grounds for Expanded Review, "(i) where the arbitrator's
findings of facts are not supported by substantial evidence, or (ii) where the arbitrator's
conclusions of law are erroneous." Id. (internal citation omitted).
36 Id. The arbitrator decided that Mattel would not have to indemnify Hall Street by finding
that the Oregon Drinking Water Act was a law related to human health as distinct from the
environment. Id.
37 Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, 2008 WL 762537, at *3 (U.S. 2008). The district court
found that the arbitrator failed to properly apply the environmental law, vacated his decision, and
remanded the case to him with instructions to follow the environmental law. Id.
38 id.
39 Id. at *3-*4.
40 Id. The circuit court held that under its recent en banc decision in Kyocera v. PrudentialBache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 1000 (9th Cir. 2003), expanded Review was no longer
recognized in the Ninth Circuit. Id.
41 Id. at *4. On remand the district court vacated the award, considering the arbitrator's
interpretation of the lease "implausible."
Id.
The circuit court reversed finding that
"implausibility" was not a grounds for vacatur found in the Act. Id.
42 Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, 2008 WL 762537, at *4 (U.S. 2008). The dispute related to
the contention that Expanded Review would "create federal jurisdiction by private contract." Id.
at *4 n.2.
43 See id.at *4 (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443
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The Court reminded that the Act does not bestow federal jurisdiction, but
controls only when parties meet federal jurisdictional benchmarks
independent of the Act.44 However, the Court explained that once parties
meet this independent jurisdictional requirement, the Act makes arbitration
agreements, "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable" as long as they involve
"commerce." 45
The Court then noted the Act's mechanisms for
confirmation, vacation, correction, or modification in §§ 9-11, helped
achieve the Act's objectives and streamline enforcement of arbitration
awards.46
After establishing touchstone policy, jurisdictional niceties, and
mechanics of the Act, the Court announced its holding and proceeded to the
heart of its reasoning against Expanded Review.47
The Court first
addressed a Pro-Expansionist argument raised by Hall Street. 48 Hall Street

contended that the Court's endorsement of a non-§ 10 Ground for review in
Wilko v. Swan, 49 opened the door to standards of review not found in the
Act.5 ° While the Court acknowledged that such an interpretation was
arguable, it was first contradicted by the fact that "the statement [Hall
Street] relie[d] on expressly reject[ed] just what Hall Street asks for here,

general review for arbitrator's legal errors.",5' Further, the Court noted that
Hall Street's reading was strained and listed two alternative interpretations
of manifest disregard.52 Specifically that the statement in Wilko: (1)
merely referred to "the § 10 Grounds collectively;" or (2) that manifest
disregard referred to § 10(a)(3)'s arbitrator "misconduct" or § 10(a)(4)'s

(2006)) (explaining purpose of Act to establish "national policy favoring [arbitration] and placing
arbitration agreements on equal footing with other contracts.").
44 Id. at *4. The Court quoted Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983), to establish that the Act is "something of an anomaly in the field of
federal court jurisdiction" because parties must meet jurisdiction independent of the act. Id.
45 Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2002)). The Court furthered that so long as the underlying
dispute involves "commerce," the Act will also apply in state courts where parties seek
enforcement of awards. Id. (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1984)).
46

Id.

47 Hall Street Assocs., 2008 WL 762537, at *4-*5.
48 Id. at *4.
49 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
5t Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, 2008 WL 762537, at *4 (U.S. 2008). In deciding that the
Securities Act of 1933 superseded any agreement to arbitrate claims stemming from violations of
this act, the Wilko court remarked in dicta that, "the interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in
contrast to manifest disregard [of the law] are not subject, in the federal courts to judicial review
for error in interpretation." Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37 (explaining principle overruled by
Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)).
51 Hall Street Assocs., 2008 WL 762537, at *5 (pointing out contradiction in Hall Street's
argument).
52 Id. (presenting alternative interpretations of"manifest disregard").
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"exceeding powers" language.5 3
Though the Court demurred from
expressly endorsing either of these alternative arguments, it54concluded that
"manifest disregard" implicated no new standard of review.
The Court's textual interpretation of the Act anchored its reasoning
against Expanded Review.55 To begin with, the Court acknowledged the
contractualist foundation of Hall Street's argument.56 Namely, since the
Act allows parties to customize many of the rules of arbitration proceedings
and aims to enforce party agreements as written, courts ought to also
enforce contracts for Expanded Review.57 The Hall Street Court found this
argument unsustainable against the textual features of the act. 58 The Court
emphasized that under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, since §§ 10-1 1 set
out specific terms focusing on "egregious departures from the parties
agreed-upon arbitration," a general term found at the end of this statutory
series is "confined to covering subjects comparable to the specifics it
follows." 59 Accordingly, since this general term buttoned-up the grounds
for review and confined them to matters referenced by the specific terms,
the drafters of the Act left no room for Expanded Review. 60 Finally, the
Court stressed that the mandatory language in § 9 ("must grant")
commands courts to confirm awards unless one of the stipulated exceptions
in §§ 10-1 1 are met. 6 1 The Court concluded this mandate provided no
62
opportunity for reading Expanded Review into the Act.
A bit later in its reasoning, the Hall Street Court bolstered its
textual analysis with historical arguments relating to the passage of the

53 Id. (listing plausible "manifest disregard" interpretations).
54 Id. ("[Wie see no reason to accord ["manifest disregard"] the significance that Hall Street
urges."). Thus Court implied that the § 10 Grounds are the exclusive standards for review of
arbitration awards. Id.
55 Id. at *6-*7 (presenting textual argument).
56 Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, 2008 WL 762537, at *6 (U.S. 2008); see id. (quoting Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985)) (noting Act, "motivated, first and
foremost, by a congressional desire to enforce agreements into which parties ha[ve] entered.").
57 Id.

"

Id. at *6-*7 (2008).
59 Id. at *6.
The specific terms the court listed were, "'corruption," fraud,"evident
partiality,' 'misconduct,'
'misbehavior,' 'exceed[ing] . . . powers,' 'evident material
miscalculation,' 'evident material mistake,' 'award[s] upon a matter not submitted."' Id. The
general term the court cites was, "imperfections" relating to a "matter of form not affecting the
merits." Id.
60 See id. ("'Fraud' and mistake of law are not cut from the same cloth.").
61 See Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, 2008 WL 762537, at *6 (U.S. 2008) ("There is nothing
malleable about, 'must grant,' which unequivocally tells court to grant confirmation in all cases,
except when one of the [§§ 10 or 11] exceptions applies.").
62 Id.
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Act.63 The Court noted that the drafters of the Act based its text and
principles on New York's 1920 arbitration statute.64 Emphasizing its point,
the Court recognized the similarities between the New York statute's and
the Act's vacatur and modification or correction grounds.65 Lastly, the
Court contrasted the Act with the Illinois statute existing at the time which
allowed for Expanded Review. 66 The Court found this conscious choice of
the New York statute illustrated
Congressional desire for exclusive vacatur
67
review.
limited
and
grounds
The Hall Street Court hastily summarized some policy arguments
against Expanded Review. 68 First, the Court stressed that limited review
disputes
facilitated "arbitration's
essential
virtue of resolving
straightway. ''69 If §§ 9-1 1 were read differently, arbitration would start to
require "legal" and "evidentiary" appeals that would judicialize arbitration
and detract from arbitration's status as a distinct and effective alternative to
courts.70 The Court quoted Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade
Services, Inc., 71 explaining such a reading would "rende[r] informal
arbitration merely a prelude to a more cumbersome and time-consuming
judicial review process. 72 According to the Court, such a reading would
implicate the institutional integrity of arbitration by "bringing arbitration
theory to grief in post-arbitration process." 73 Finally, the Court refused to
consider what the greater implications of its holding against Expanded
Review would be for parties seeking to resolve their disputes, but
reemphasized that the Act's grounds for vacatur, modification or correction

63 Id. at *7-*8 & n.7. Justice Scalia agreed with the majority on all points except footnote
seven, but gave no reasons for his disagreement. Id. at *2.
64 Id. at *7 & n.7.
65 See id. (labeling language "virtually identical").
66 See Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, 2008 WL 762537, at *7 (U.S. 2008) (contrasting New

York statute with Illinois Arbitration and Awards Act of 1917).
67 Id. The Court illustrated this choice by noting the testimony of one of the New York
statue's draftsman. Id. The Court noted that this same drafter, in a "contemporaneous campaign
for promulgation of a uniform state arbitration law," contrasted the New York statute with the
Illinois Arbitration and Awards Act of 1917 which allowed for Expanded Review based on errors
of law. Id.
68 Id. The opinion dedicated a mere two sentences to policy arguments. Id. The Court noted
that the limited review found in §§ 9-11 of the Act established core policy objectives of the Act.
Id.
69 Id. (presenting policy argument relating to speed, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness of
arbitration).
70 Id. (arguing Expanded Review leads to judicialization of arbitration).
71 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003).
72 Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, 2008 WL 762537, at *7 (U.S. 2008).
73 Id.
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were exclusive. 74 The Court referenced several amici submissions that
argued either angle if the court struck down Expanded Review: some saw
a flight from arbitration while others postulated a shift towards
arbitration.7 5
Before concluding, the majority opinion delivered a curious
reservation about its holding stating:
In holding that §§ 10 and 11 provide exclusive regimes for
the review provided by the statute, we do not purpose to
say that they exclude more searching review based on
authority outside the statute. The [Act] is not the only way
into court for parties wanting review of arbitration award:
they may contemplate enforcement under state statutory or
common law, for example, where judicial review of
different scope is arguable. But here we speak only to the
scope of expeditious judicial review under §§ 9, 10, and
11, deciding nothing about other possible avenues for
judicial enforcement of arbitration awards.76
The Court did not expound upon this language (hereinafter the
"Cryptic Language") as to what alternative avenues parties could take to
activate Expanded Review and it noted that the parties in the case-in-chief
did not present such an avenue in their briefs.77 Still, the Court explained
that a question was raised at oral argument as to whether the arbitration
agreement between Hall Street and Mattel could be considered "an exercise
of the District Court's authority to manage its cases under Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 16.''78 The Court referred to the parties' supplemental
briefs which discussed waiver and the interaction between the Act, Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 16 ("FRCP 16"), and the Alterative Dispute Act of
1998.79 While refusing to consider the issue relating to FRCP 16, the Court
explained that Hall Street could pursue it further on remand. 80 The Court
then reiterated its holding against Expanded Review, but vacated the
judgment and remanded the case based on these new issues. 8'
Three justices dissented from the majority opinion, arguing that

74
75
76
77

Id.
Id.
See id.at *8 (explaining reservation).
Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, 2008 WL 762537, at *8 (U.S. 2008).

78 Id.
" Id. at *9.
80 Id.
8]

Id.
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Expanded Review should be permitted.8 2 For example, Justice Stevens
grounded his dissent on the contractualist maxim that Act policy is to
"ensure agreements are enforced according to their terms. 8 3 Thus, he
argued, the Court ought to give effect to "fairly negotiated" agreements to
expand judicial review beyond the grounds presented in the Act. 4 Justice
Stevens contended that because the parties expressly agreed on a provision
for Expanded Review based on errors of law and the arbitrator committed a
"rather glaring" error of law, the Court ought to support the district court's
holding.85 Further, Justice Stevens argued this contractualist goal of
respecting parties' agreements overrides the majority's reading of the §§
10-11 Grounds as exclusive. 86 Justice Stevens also disagreed with the
majority's historical argument because he contended the purpose of §§ 10
and 11 was to reverse judicial hostility to arbitration, not to list exclusive
grounds for review. 87
III. ANALYSIS
The following discussion will show how the Hall Street Court, in
holding that the Act's grounds for review are exclusive, did a successful
job both in resolving many of the pivotal questions relating to Expanded
Review and in succinctly and methodically disassembling the pillars of
Pro-Expansionism. This analysis will demonstrate the Court's successful
methodology when it: (1) resolved a small skirmish relating to the
jurisdiction of the Act; (2) closed the door on the "manifest disregard" nonstatutory standard; (3) demonstrated that contractualism yields to the text of
the Act; (4) buttressed its textual interpretation with a historical analysis of
the Act; and (5) emphasized some key policy objectives of the Act. 88
Regarding the latter point, this analysis will highlight two important policy

82 See Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, 2008 WL 762537, at *9-*11 (U.S. 2008) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing for Expanded Review based on contractualism and an alterative historical
interpretation); id. at * 11 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (agreeing with Justice Stevens but calling for
mere confirmation of the final arbitration award).
83 Id. at *9 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478) (1989)).
84 Id. at *9 (arguing for primacy of party intent).
85 Id. at *10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86 Id.(Stevens, J., dissenting).
87 Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, 2008 WL 762537, at *10 & n.3 (U.S. 2008) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
88 See infra Part III.A. (discussing jurisdiction of the Act); infra Part III.B. (deconstructing
"manifest disregard"); infra Part III.C. (presenting textual analysis of Act); infra Part III.D.
(developing historical analysis); infra Part III.E.
(noting policy concerns).

106

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XIII

considerations that the Court failed to address. 89 Finally, the analysis
argues that the Court took an unnecessary misstep when it inserted its
"Cryptic Language," giving Expanded Review a lifeline that might allow
the doctrine to endure, albeit not in federal court when the Act is in play. 90
The opinion will hypothesize, given this language, what category of cases
might still be able to get Expanded Review. 91
A. A JurisdictionalPrimer

In

reminding

its

audience

of

the

unique

jurisdictional

characteristics of the Act, the Court settled a matter that had led to some
debate amongst circuits and authorities on both sides of Expanded
Review. 92 While the Court did not cite the opinion, this debate derives
from Judge Posner's suggestion, in Chicago Typographical Union No. 16.
v. Chicago Sun-Times,93 that parties "cannot contract for judicial review of

[an arbitration] award [because] federal jurisdiction cannot be created by
contract., 94 Pro-Expansionists validly pointed out that this argument
against Expanded Review was misplaced, while many Anti-Expansionists
explained away this contention. 95 The Court resolutely put this matter to

rest explaining that under the Act parties must independently meet diversity
or federal question jurisdictional benchmarks to have an arbitration
decision reviewed in federal court.96 The Court also explained
that to
97
implicate the Act, the matter in dispute must involve "commerce.,

89

See infra Part III.E. (arguing Expanded Review inhibits unique arbitrator awards and chills

"A-national" arbitration).
90 See infra Part II1.F. (analyzing Cryptic Language).
9" See infra Part III.F. (hypothesizing avenues to Expanded Review opened by Cryptic
Language).
92 Hall Street Assocs., 2008 WL 762537, at *4 & n.2.
93 935 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 1991).
94 Id. at 1505. Though the Court did not cite Chicago Typo, footnote two's language closely

mirrored the quote above from the Seventh Circuit. Hall Street Assocs., 2008 WL 762537, at *4
n.2. The Court wrote "there is no merit in the argument that enforcing [an] arbitration
agreement's judicial review provision would create federal jurisdiction by private contract." Id.
95 See Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 30-31(1st Cir. 2005) ("It
is well settled that federal
only if the parties are . . .
Holstein, supra note 17,
surrogate").
96 Hall Street Assocs.,

courts have jurisdiction over suits seeking to compel arbitration...
diverse ... or some separate grant of jurisdiction applies."). But see
at 145 (arguing Posner's jurisdictional warning was "rhetorical

2008 WL 762537, at *4.
97 Id. (quoting 9. U.S.C. § 2 (2002)). The Court also reminded that Act can apply in state
court if the underlying matter involves "commerce." Id.
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B. Disregarding"Manifest Disregard"
In striking down "manifest disregard," the Hall Street Court struck
The debate swirling around
a critical blow to Pro-Expansionists. 98
"manifest disregard" baffled both sides and spawned a variety of theories. 99
Like Hall Street, Pro-Expansion courts and commentators founded their
arguments on the notion that the Supreme Court would permit Expanded
Review on other grounds like errors of law because it had already
recognized a non-statutory standard.' 00 First, the Court did a masterful job

when it illustrated the logical contradiction in Hall Street's argument; the
quotation from Wilko, supposedly endorsing a non-statutory standard, in
reality rejected Expanded Review.101 The Court then discussed the various
interpretations of "manifest disregard" and though the Court refused to
assertively
explain exactly what "manifest disregard" meant, they
2
mandated what it was not-a sanction of Expanded Review. 10
C. Exclusivity ofAct Standardsof Review
After discrediting "manifest disregard," the Court went for the kill
stroke on Expanded Review when it established that the Act's standards of
review are exclusive. 0 3 The Court dedicated the bulk of its analysis
04

against Expanded Review to a statutory interpretation of the Act's text.'
The

Court

Expansionists'

pitted

strength

against

strength,

setting

strongest argument, contractualism,

up

the

Pro-

versus the most

compelling Anti-Expansion counterpoint, textual interpretation of the

98

See id. at *4-*5 (analyzing "manifest disregard").

99 See Goldman, supra note 9, at 183-84 (advocating

Supreme Court endorsement of
"manifest disregard" standard demonstrates § 10 Grounds are not exclusive). But see Bowen v.
Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 937 (10th Cir. 2001) (theorizing "manifest disregard" may
derive from 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4)); Curtin, supra note 9, at 351 (describing "manifest disregard"
standard, "[as] little more than a historical oddity that is rarely, if ever, successfully asserted.");
Enkishev, supra note 1, at 66-67 (arguing labor arbitration exclusivity of non-statutory standards
for review).
00 Hall Street Assocs., 2008 WL 762537, at *5 (contending "manifest disregard" blessed
Expanded Review); Goldman, supra note 9, at 183-84 (arguing Supreme Court endorsement of
"manifest disregard" standard demonstrates § 10 Grounds are not exclusive).
101 Hall Street Assocs., 2008 WL 762537, at *5.
102 See id. (explaining, "we see no reason to accord ["manifest disregard"] the significance
that Hall Street urges."). This ruling will likely put an end to the circuit-developed strains of
review which evolved out of "manifest disregard." Id.; see also Drahozal, supra note 9, at 234
(explaining all circuits developed some form of "manifest disregard" review).
103 Hall Street Assocs., 2008 WL 762537, at *4 (holding against Expanded Review).
104 Id. at *6-*7.
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Act. 105
The Court wisely began its textual synopsis by acknowledging the
stalwart foundation of Pro-Expansion, that the goal of arbitration is to
enforce parties' agreements as written. 0 6 First, nearly all authorities agree
that arbitration is a "creature of contract" and that the contractual
agreement between parties remains the foundation of arbitration. 0 7 While
the majority did not specifically cite the opinion, the root of the
contractualist argument in favor of Expanded Review lies in the edict found
in Volt, which indicated that the fundamental arbitration policy is to,

"ensure agreements are enforced according to their terms."' 0t Indeed, some
Pro-Expansion commentators contend that not only is Expanded Review

permissible under United States arbitration policy, but the Supreme Court
requires this faithfulness to parties' agreements when Expanded Review is
properly invoked. 0 9 The Court also noted that arbitration allows parties to
tailor many of the rules and procedures including choosing the applicable
law. ' 0 Pro-Expansionists maintain that this autonomy ought to extend to
judicial review."'
The second part of the Pro-Expansion Volt-based
analysis posits that because of this party autonomy, the § 10 Grounds only
represent suggested templates or "off the rack" models, dismissible and
replaceable by party will." 2
1o5See infra text accompanying notes 113-120 (analyzing Hall Street Court's examination of
the Act's text).
106 Hall Street Assocs., 2008 WL 762537, at *6.
017 Id. at *5. Without citing some of the Pro-Expansion opinions, in this section, the Court
deftly evoked the analysis of these opinions by coining some of the key phraseology used by
these courts, for example labeling arbitration as a "creature of contract." Id.;
see Gateway Techs.,
Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting arbitration as "creature of
contract").
108 Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
478 (1989); see Hall Street Assocs., 2008 WL 762537, at *9 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (utilizing
Volt language to ground his dissent in favor of Expanded Review); Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. U.S.
Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 2005) (ruling for Expanded Review based on Volt);
Gateway, 64 F.3d at 996-97 (founding Expanded Review argument on Volt).
109 See Gateway, 64 F.3d at 997 (asserting Supreme Court demands adherence to party
intentions).
110Hall Street Assocs., 2008 WL 762537, at *5; see Gatewav, 64 F.3d at 996 (quoting Volt
489 U.S. at 479). (arguing "parties may . . .specify by contract the rules under which . . .
arbitration will be conducted.").
III See Puerto Rico Tel., 427 F.3d at 31 ("The [Act's] ultimate purpose is to enforce the
terms of the agreement to arbitrate . .. [courts] ...are therefore bound by federal law to enforce
the arbitration agreements as drafted.").
112 See Hall Street Assocs., 2008 WL 762537, at *10 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (describing §§
10-11 grounds as starting point and a "shield ...[against] hostile courts."); Roadway Package
System, Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 2001) (classifying § 10 Grounds as "off-therack"); Gateway, 64 F.3d at 997 (labeling § 10 Grounds as "default"). The Hall Street Court
referenced this notion by explaining that some circuits have labeled the review confirmation and
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After setting up the pillars of the contractualist arguments in favor
of Expanded Review, the Court cut this argument down with an incisive
textual analysis of the Act.' 13 The Court set the stage noting, "to rest this
case on the general policy of treating arbitration agreements as enforceable
. . beg[s] the question, which is whether the FAA has textual features at
odds with enforcing a contract with [Expanded Review]."' 14 First, the
Court closely analyzed the text of §§ 10- 11 and found that all the terms
dealing with review of arbitrator's decisions were explicit and focused on
extreme conduct like arbitrator "fraud" or "bias." ' 15 Though the last term,
"imperfections" suggested slightly more plasticity, the Court explained that
under the ejusdem generis rule, this general term can only cover subjects
expressed in the specific terms preceding it."16 The Court found this tight7
drafting "at odds" with loose language allowing for Expanded Review."
Further anchoring Anti-Expansion with text of the Act, the Court focused
its scrutiny on the mandatory language of § 9 of the Act." 8 The Court
found "no hint of flexibility" in the instructions of § 9-a reviewing court
*

"must grant" a confirmation order unless one of the specific exceptions

found in § 10 or § 11 applies.' "9 Thus the Court answered its own question
as to whether the policy of enforcing agreements as written must yield to
the text of the Act, "the text compels a reading of the §§ 10 and 11
12
categories as exclusive." 0

review mechanism as "default." Hall Street Assocs., 2008 WL 762537, at *7.
113 See Hall Street Assocs., 2008 WL 762537, at *6-*7 (presenting textual analysis).
114 Id. at *6.
115 Id. The specific terms the Court listed were, "'corruption,' 'fraud,' 'evident partiality,'
misconduct,' 'misbehavior,' 'exceed[ing] . . . powers,' 'evident material miscalculation,'
'evident material mistake,' 'award[s] upon a matter not submitted."' Id.
116 Id. Thus, by implication, any "imperfections" would have to relate only to the extreme
conduct enumerated in the specific terms. Id.
117 Id. The Court explained, "(s)ince a general term included in the text is normally so
limited, then surely a statute with no textual hook for expansion cannot authorize contracting
parties to supplement review for specific instance of outrageous conduct with review for just any
legal error." Id. The Court furthered, "'(f)raud' and mistake of law are not cut from the same
cloth."
Id. This reasoning comports with some Anti-Expansion circuits that utilized
Congressional intent to advocate for the exclusivity of the § 10 Grounds. Bowen v. Amoco
Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 934 (10th Cir. 2001).
118 Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, 2008 WL 762537, at *6 (U.S. 2008); see Enkishev, supra
note 1, at 70 (analyzing text of the Act).
119 Hall Street Assocs., 2008 WL 762537, at *6. With such strong language, the Court found
no basis for extrapolating a reviewing ground not listed in the Act. Id.
120 Id. at *6 (asking "whether the [Act] has textual features at odds with enforcing a contract
[with an Expanded Review clause?]); see id. (answering question).
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D. History Lesson
Next, the Court buttressed its textual interpretation with the
historical circumstances surrounding the drafting of the Act.' 2' The Court
explained that the Act was based on the New York arbitration statute which
provided the same limited grounds for vacatur, modification, or correction
found in §§ 10 and 11 of the Act. 122 Further, the Court noted that another
statute, the Illinois Arbitration Act and Awards Act of 1917-existing prior
23
to the 1925 drafting of the Act-actually allowed for Expanded Review.'
The Court found this contrast elucidating-Congress could have adopted a

scheme permitting Expanded Review, but instead they choose to adopt the
provisions of a statute that confined judicial review to narrow grounds like
arbitrator fraud and bias. 124 The Court
interpreted Congress' action as a
25
manifestation of Anti-Expansionism. 1
E.Policy
The Hall Street Court likely intended to keep its decision narrow
and focused mainly on the text of the Act, however, the Court did mention
some of the policy implicated by §§ 9-1 1.126 The Court first evoked the
speed and efficiency of arbitration when it noted that limited review
facilitated, "arbitration's
essential virtue
of resolving disputes
27
straightway."'1 By agreeing to arbitration, parties choose to sacrifice the
deliberate accuracy of federal court decisions in exchange for rapid,
flexible, and economical arbitration decisions.' 28 Though the Court did not
121 See id. at *7 (developing historical analysis).
122Id.; see also, King, supra note 17, at 955-56 (citing Ian R. MacNeil et al., Federal
Arbitration Law § 40.1.4 (Supp. 1999)) (observing drafters of Act deliberately opted to exclude
provisions allowing for judicial review for legal error). King chronicled Professor MacNeil's
argument that the American Bar Association actually drafted the Act and that Congress merely
rubber stamped that draft. Id. at 955.
123Hall Street Assocs., 2008 WL 762537, at *7. In further support of this concept, King
noted that in addition to the Illinois statute, the English Arbitration Act of 1889 also provided for
Expanded Review. King, supra note 17, at 956 (citing tan R. MacNeil et al., Federal Arbitration
Law § 40.1.4 (Supp. 1999)).
124 Hall Street Assocs., 2008 WL 762537, at *7. But see id. at *10 (Stevens, J. dissenting)
(arguing adoption of §§ 10 and 11 designed to reverse judicial hostility to arbitration and not to
provide exclusive grounds for review).
125 Hall Street Assocs., 2008 WL 762537, at *7.
126 See id. at *7 (articulating policy arguments against Expanded Review). The opinion
dedicated only two sentences outright to policy. Id.
121 Id. at *7.
128 Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Services, Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 999 (9th Cir.

2003) (citing speed, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness of arbitration).
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elaborate on this effect, Expanded Review threatens the benefits of
expeditious, adaptive, and cost-efficient arbitration proceedings by adding
at least another layer of detailed federal court searching. 29 Also, because
arbitrators facing the specter of a merits review from a federal court would
need to explain their findings of fact and write detailed opinions, they need
more time to write awards.' 30 As a result, parties to arbitration would face
slower and more expensive proceedings.' 13 In touting the virtues of speed
Street Court indicated that such
and efficiency in arbitration, the Hall 32
factors weigh against Expanded Review.'
The Court then elaborated on the "judicializing" effect that
The Court explained that
Expanded Review has on arbitration.' 33
Expanded Review would instigate appeals based on "legal" and
"evidentiary" matters, grounds normally confined to decisions rendered in
a court of law.' 3 4 As the Court signaled, Expanded Review turns
arbitration into a test run for litigation by transforming "informal
arbitration [into] merely a prelude to a more cumbersome and timeconsuming judicial review process."' 135 Again, though the Court did not
elaborate, as other authorities demonstrated, Expanded Review turns
arbitration proceedings into "mini-district courts" which consider parties'
issues and make determinations of fact while "forc[ing] federal trial courts
to sit as appellate courts.' 36 In listing this concern, the Court recognized
that Expanded Review mars the distinction between arbitration and
litigation, making arbitration an unrecognizable proceeding of questionable
13 7
utility.
The Court's last policy concern was closely tied to the preceding
discussion on "judicialization."' 38 The Court stressed that a narrow reading
of the Act maintains the integrity of arbitration as an institution distinct

129 See Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 999 (noting trade-off contemplated by Congress in enacting the
Act); Krause, supra note 1, at 79 (listing arbitration benefits of "speed, economy, finality,
confidentiality, flexibility, arbitrator expertise and neutrality of forum").
130 See Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 936 (10th Cir. 2001) (describing effects
of forcing arbitrators to write detailed opinions).
131 id.
132 Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, 2008 WL 762537, at *7 (U.S. 2008).
133 Id. (discussing "legal" and "evidentiary" appeals).
134Id.
135 Id. (quoting Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Services, Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 998
(9th Cir. 2003)).
136 See Schoch v. InfoUSA, Inc., 341 F.3d 785, 789 & n.3 (8th Cir. 2003) (describing ill
effects of Expanded Review on roles of arbitrators and federal district courts).
137 Hall Street Assocs., 2008 WL 762537, at *7.
130 Id. (discussing institutional integrity of arbitration).
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from litigation.' 39 The Court found that reading Expanded Review into §§
9-11 of the Act would implicate the institutional integrity of arbitration by
40
"bringing arbitration theory to grief in post-arbitration process.0
Congress enacted the Act to provide a functional system where the
arbitrator and the judiciary roles are clearly defined. 141 As the Hall Street
Court acknowledged earlier in its opinion, parties to an arbitration
proceeding tailor rules for an arbitrator to follow and specifically choose an
142
arbitrator suited to resolve their dispute according to these rules.
However, once an arbitrator issues an award, that award is final and the
judiciary, under mandate from the Act, examines the process and ensures
that the arbitration was devoid of gross procedural errors. 143
A
combination of Hall Street's concern over Expanded Review's negative
effect on "arbitration theory" with its narrow and exclusive reading of §§ 911 of the Act, demonstrated that the Court was concerned that the doctrine
could have upset this framework established by Congress. 144
Though the Court generally succeeded in striking down Expanded
Review based on the text of the Act, the history of the Act, and the limited
policy concerns addressed above, the Court could have strengthened the
45
force of its argument with a least two further policy considerations.
First, an essential benefit of arbitration as an alternative mechanism for
dispute resolution is that arbitrators, unfettered by wooden judicial
procedure, have the power to fashion awards uniquely suited to a particular

139 Id.

140 Id. (describing effect Expanded Review has on arbitration as a distinct mechanism for
dispute resolution).
141 See Hoeft v. MVL Group, 343 F.3d 57, 66 (2d Cir. 2003) ("Judicial review is not a
creature of contract, and the authority of a federal court to review an arbitration award ... does
not derive from a private agreement."); Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Services, Inc.,
341 F.3d 987, 1000 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining when federal court receives dispute, parties'
control over arbitration process ends); Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 932 (10th
Cir. 2001) (noting purpose of the Act was to ensure limited and narrow review of arbitration
awards); Holstein, supra note 17, at 147 (arguing Act deliberately allocates control over
arbitration to parties and circumscribes judiciary's role to limited review of arbitrator's decision).
142 See Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, 2008 WL 762537, at *6 (U.S. 2008) ("[T]he [Act] lets
parties tailor some, even many features of arbitration .... ).
143 See Holstein, supra note 17, at 130-31 (describing limited role of judiciary in reviewing
arbitral award).
144 See Holstein, supra note 17, at 147 (describing Act's division of labor between private
parties and the judiciary); see also Kyocera Corp., 341 F.3d at 998 (discussing harm done by
Expanded Review to structural soundness of arbitration); Hoefi, 343 F.3d at 66 ("Judicial review
is not a creature of contract and the authority of the federal court to review an arbitration award or
any other matter-does not derive from a private agreement.").
145 See infra text accompanying notes 146-151 (showing negative effect of Expanded
Review on unique arbitrator awards and "A-national" arbitration).
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dispute. 46 If Expanded Review was allowed and the doctrine became more
prevalent, arbitrators may have curbed their use of such remedies out of
fear of judicial overrule or revision. 4 7 Second, Expanded Review would
have potentially deleterious effects on the international movement towards
"A-national" arbitration.14 8 International parties often choose arbitration as
a way of resolving their disputes while avoiding the potential parochialism
of national courts. 14 9 Expanded Review would have either shattered or
seriously undermined commercial serenity by allowing a federal court to
If
review the substantive considerations of the underlying dispute. 50
have
who
parties
international
given
effect,
clauses
were
Review
Expanded
ostensibly chosen arbitration in order to avoid the partiality of domestic
dispute according to
courts, may have found themselves rearguing their
5
'
United States law during the confirmation hearing.'
F. Cryptic Language
Though the Hall Street Court resolved the Expanded Review
split
and answered many of the questions stemming from this
circuit
doctrine, by inserting the Cryptic Language, the Court unnecessarily
opened another mysterious chapter in this debate. 152 After dismantling the
Pro-Expansion case, the Court explained that Expanded Review may be
available, "based on authority outside the statue.' 53 While Expanded
Review is no longer available in federal courts applying the Act, the Court
noted that parties may utilize "state statutory" schemes or "common law"

146 See Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 936 (10th Cir. 2001) (discussing effect
Expanded Review has on unique arbitrator awards).
147 Id. (explaining chilling effect Expanded Review has on arbitrator creativity).
148 See Carbonneau, supra note 2, at 28-29 (describing movement towards "A-national"
arbitration).
149 See Carbonneau, supra note 2, at 28 (explaining international parties' motivation for
choosing arbitration). Ideally, national courts called upon to enforce such awards avoid
substantive considerations of law by confirming the award as long as the parties' arbitration
agreement is valid and the tribunal met certain procedural norms. Wasserstein, supra note 2, at
74.
150 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985)
(describing Supreme Court's preference for arbitration as dispute resolution mechanism for
parties in international trade). Permitting a federal court to consider the substantive merits of an
arbitration proceeding would arguably undermine the policy outlined in Mitsubishi and transform
the confirmation proceeding into litigation. Id.
1 See Schoch v. InfoUSA, Inc., 341 F.3d 785, 789 & n.3 (8th Cir. 2003) (explaining
Expanded Review co-opts Federal Courts into reviewing merits of dispute).
152 See supra text accompanying note 76 (reciting Cryptic Language).
153 Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, 2008 WL 762537, at *8 (U.S. 2008) (postulating non-Act
avenues to Expanded Review).
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schemes where more searching review is "arguable. 1 54 These comments
beg the question, what category of disputes is the Court vaguely
referencing here? Though this note advocates eradication of Expanded
Review altogether, the following discussion will list the following potential
avenues to or forums allowing Expanded Review: (1) FRCP 16; (2)
confirmation and review in state courts where the underlying matter does
not involve commerce; and (3) confirmation and review proceedings in
state courts (in states with schemes hospitable to Expanded Review)
in
55
which the parties carefully and explicitly draft their review clauses.'
The first explanation to the Cryptic Language and the avenue
towards possible Expanded is confined to the facts of Hall Street case. The
Court referred to the parties' supplemental briefs which discussed the
interaction between the Act, FRCP 16, and the Alterative Dispute Act of
1998.156 The parties drafted and entered into their arbitration agreement
while their district court litigation was pending and they did so with leave
of the district court. 57 Therefore the Court questions whether the
agreement (and its Expanded Review clause) should be considered "an
exercise of the district court's authority to manage its cases under [FRCP
16].""58 Though the Court failed to address this issue, the indication may
be that in certain limited cases, a district court's authority under FRCP 16
supersedes the Act and allows for Expanded Review clauses.1 59 However,
given the mention of "state statutory" schemes for Expanded Review, the
class of disputes160hinted at by the Court likely exceeds those confined to the
FRCP 16 issue.
A second category of admittedly small and extremely rare disputes
154 Id. The Court also mentioned the "common law" as a potential source of authority for
Expanded Review. Id. One possible explanation of the "'common law" reference is that the Court
was referring to contractual defenses such as waiver, which the Court noted the parties referenced
in their supplemental briefs. See id. at *9 (discussing waiver arguments raised by parties'
supplemental briefs). Yet, if the Court was referencing waiver, this subject would likely
implicate formation and arbitrability defenses, not standards of review. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000)
(explaining arbitration agreements "shall be valid, revocable and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.").
155 See infra Part IV.A. (urging state courts and judges to extirpate Expanded Review); infra
text accompanying notes 156-160 (articulating FRCP 16 argument); infra text accompanying
notes 161-163 (noting Court may be referencing disputes not effecting "'commerce"); infra text
accompanying notes 164-169 (theorizing Court may be signaling parties wanting Expanded
Review can use explicit choice-of-law clauses to co-opt state schemes hospitable to the doctrine).
156 Hall Street Assocs., 2008 WL 762537, at *8-*9 (discussing FRCP 16 arguments raised by
parties in supplemental briefs).
157 Id. at *3 (reciting procedural history).
158 Id. at *8 (suggesting FRCP 16 may control the parties' arbitration agreement).
159 Id.
160 See infra text accompanying notes 161-169 (theorizing disputes not effecting
"commerce" and those involving state arbitration statutes may still get Expanded Review).
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potentially addressed by the Cryptic Language would be those disputes
involving matters not effecting "commerce.' 6 1 As the Hall Street Court
reminded, the Act applies in federal and state court, but only in cases
involving "commerce. ' 162 Thus hypothetically, parties to a dispute not
involving commerce could choose a state with a statutory scheme
hospitable to Expanded Review, draft an arbitration agreement with an
Expanded Review clause, and avoid the reach the Act. 163 While an
illustrative example evades this author's creative thought, given the wide
range of disputes that go to arbitration, one surely exists.
The most plausible route to Expanded Review implicated by the
Cryptic Language may relate to utilization of a choice-of-law clause.' 64 In
mentioning "state statutory" schemes, perhaps in a tip of the cap to
federalism and the broad jurisdictional reach of state courts, the Court left
open the possibility that with very specific drafting, parties could craft an
65
agreement allowing for Expanded Review of an arbitration agreement.1
At least three Pro-Expansion circuits indicated that inclusion of a generic
choice-of-law clause on its own was not enough to activate Expanded
16 7
Review. 166 Similarly in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,

a case involving a choice-of-law clause (but not Expanded Review), the
Supreme Court also held that a generic choice-of-law clause by itself could
not inhibit the powers of an arbitrator. 68 As a logical corollary, if parties
combined: (1) a choice-of-law referencing a state favorably disposed
towards Expanded Review, and (2) an explicit choice of this state's
arbitration statute (which would include provisions for Expanded Review),
they might have provided the missing ingredient needed to access

161 See

in/ra text accompanying notes 162-163 (explaining disputes not effecting
"commerce" may get Expanded Review).
162 Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, 2008 WL 762537, at *4 (U.S. 2008) (citing Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1984)).
163 Id. at *8 (referencing "state statutory" schemes where Expanded Review is "arguable").
164 See in/Ia text accompanying notes 165-169 (postulating Expanded Review may still be
available in state courts with careful draftsmanship).
165 See Hall Street Assocs., 2008 WL 762537, at *8 (suggesting parties may still obtain
Expanded Review under "state statutory" arbitration schemes).
166 See Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 29-30 (1st Cir. 2005)
(holding generic choice-of-law clause not enough to activate Expanded Review); Jacada (Europa)
Ltd. v. Int'l Mktg. Strategies, Inc. 401 F.3d 701, 712 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding choice-of-law
clause insufficient to allow Expanded Review); Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d
287, 293 (3d Cir. 2001) (concluding choice-of-law by itself would not allow parties to expand
judicial review of arbitration awards).
167 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
161 See id at 63-64 (holding choice-of-law clause on its own not enough to curb arbitrator
power).
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IV. SOLUTIONS
Though ultimately this note advocates for the eradication of
Expanded Review, three compromise solutions are offered for parties in the
wake of Hall Street who still want more searching judicial scrutiny. As a
starting point, before these solutions are developed, this section will first
issue a call to arms to state legislatures and courts to eradicate Expanded
Review.170 In recognition that there are parties who still desire Expanded
Review, this note advocates two solutions that work with the Act: (1) the
Appellate Arbitration Solution and (2) the End Around Solution.' 7 ' Finally
with the Cryptic Language as a backdrop, this note advocates a solution
which utilizes skilled draftsmanship to get Expanded Review in a state
confirming court (the "Artful Draftsman"). 72 This solution along with the
Appellate Arbitration Solution and the End Around Solution may help
counter the postulated flight from arbitration that some amici in the173Hall
Street case warned would start if Expanded Review were disallowed.
A. A Call to Arms
The Hall Street Court solved many of the open questions about
Expanded Review and enshrined the exclusivity of the § 10 Grounds in
federal courts applying the Act. 174
Yet, the Court did arbitration a disservice by leaving the door to
Expanded Review open through the Cryptic Language. 175 While the
Court's analysis about text and history speak only on Expanded Review in
relation to the Act, many of the policy arguments transcend the Act and
implicate arbitration in all forums. 176 State arbitration statutes which allow

169 See supra text accompanying notes 166-168 (explaining generic choice-of-law clauses
not enough to activate Expanded Review or inhibit arbitrator power). This may be the
mechanism the Court had in mind when it referenced "'state statutory" schemes for review. Hall
Street Assocs., 2008 WL 762537, at *8.
170See infra Part IV.A. (calling on states legislatures and courts to end Expanded Review).
171See infra Part IV.B. (outlining Appellate Arbitration Solution); infra Part IV.C.
(describing End Around Solution).
172 See inira Part IV.D. (developing Artful Draftsman solution).
173See Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, 2008 WL 762537, at *7 (U.S. 2008) (acknowledging
amici concerns about potential flight from or towards arbitration).
174 See supra Part I1L.A-E. (analyzing success of Hall Street decision).
175See supra Part III.F.
(discussing Cryptic Language and open questions presented by it).
176 See supra Part II.E. (discussing various policy implications of Expanded Review).
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defeat the speed and efficiency of arbitration,
Expanded Review:
judicialize arbitration procedures, upset the balance between arbitral
tribunals and confirming courts, prevent unique awards, and retard the
growth and consistency of "A-national" arbitration.1 77 In light of the Hall
Street decision and these policy concerns, state legislatures should work to
revise their arbitration statues to ensure that the judiciary's involvement in
arbitration is limited and confined to egregious conduct like arbitrator bias
Similarly, just as the Hall Street Court eliminated the
or fraud.' 78
supposedly judicially crafted "manifest disregard" standard of review, state
supreme courts should eradicate standards tantamount to merits review
when presented with the opportunity. 179 The end result would be a more
consistent and effective arbitration system in the United States that would
provide an attractive alternative to courts for both domestic and foreign
parties.'80
B. Appellate ArbitrationSolution
As some parties may still want Expanded Review after Hall Street,
Judge Posner's Appellate Arbitration Solution provides a balance, allowing
parties to review errors of law or fact without resorting to Expanded
Review via the courts.' 81 Parties alleging gross procedural error or
arbitrator misconduct still have access to the § 10 Grounds; but under this
framework, they also can obtain review on the merits.182 Potentially,
parties can designate such a panel by inserting the following clause into
their arbitration agreement: "Appellate Arbitration Panel: a three member
arbitral panel shall govern the review proceedings for arbitrator errors of
law or fact and shall be comprised of one designee with expertise in
relevant matters selected by each party and a third arbitrator selected by the

177

(noting various destructive effects of Expanded Review on
See supra Part III.E.

arbitration).
178 See Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, 2008 WL 762537, at *4 (U.S. 2008) (holding against
Expanded Review). The Court's announced policy objectives of ensuring limited review and
expeditious confirmation would inform such a revision. Id. at *7.
179 See id. at *5 (eliminating "manifest disregard").
180See supra note I (discussing myriad benefits of arbitration).
181See Enkishev, supra note 1, at 100-01 (demonstrating how Appellate Arbitration Solution
provides more focused review without running afoul of Act).
182See Chicago Typographical Union No. 16. v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc. 935 F.2d 1501,
1505 (7th Cir. 1991) (presenting Judge Posner's solution for parties desirous of a review on
merits). Though the Act does not authorize a judicial merits review of an arbitrator's decision,
under Judge Posner's solution, parties agree when they draft their arbitration clause to allow an
aggrieved party recourse to an appellate arbitration panel. Id.

118

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XIII

two party-chosen appellate arbitrators."'' 83 Some potential shortfalls of this
system include: (1) such a solution has an injurious effect on the speed,
finality, and cost-effectiveness of arbitration; and (2) errors of law or fact
may necessitate a jurist and not an arbitrator for proper review.184 While an
appellate arbitration panel will make an arbitration award less final, parties
can build finality language into the arbitration agreement to this end before
a dispute begins, giving the decision res judicata after review by the
appellate panel. 185 Finally, if parties absolutely require a judicial mind to
of an opinion, they can designate retired judges
assess the legal soundness
86
to act as arbitrators.1
C. End Around Solution
The End Around Solution provides a crafty mechanism, which
works within the framework of the Act but allows parties more focused
review. 18 7 This solution instructs parties to outline the rules and procedures
in clear and explicit terms when drafting their arbitration clause. 8 Thus,
any gross deviation from such rules allows the reviewing court to overturn
89
the award under the Act § 10(a)(4) "exceeding powers" provision.'
Given Hall Street's emphatic destruction of the "manifest disregard"
standard, this solution would not permit review for errors of law or fact, but
aggrieved parties may have an easier time pointing out gross arbitrator
error.190 Like the Appellate Arbitration Solution, the End Around Solution
offers a compromise allowing parties to shield themselves from rogue
arbitrators while adhering to the letter and spirit of the Act.' 9 '

183 See Chicago Tpographical Union No. 16., 935 F.2d at 1505 (presenting Appellate

Arbitration Solution). Such a clause would accord with Judge Posner's suggested solution. Id.
This solution could be utilized regardless of whether the loopholes presented by the Cryptic
Language are eventually closed. See supra Part III.F. (discussing Cryptic Language).
184 See Krause, supra note 1, at 79 (touting arbitration virtues such as speed, flexibility and
cost effectiveness).
185 See King, supra note 17, at 984-86 (explaining importance of finality to arbitration).
186 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (stating that purpose
of the Act was, in part, to reverse judicial hostility to arbitration agreements). Critics of such a
practice may note that the Appellate Arbitration Solution evidences judicial hostility towards
arbitrator capabilities. Id.
187 See Blankley, supra note 31, at 427-32 (outlining End-Around Solution).
188 See supratext accompanying note 31 (describing mechanics of End-Around Solution).
189 See supratext accompanying note 31 (describing End-Around Solution).
190 See Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, 2008 WL 762537, at *5 (U.S. 2008) (discrediting
"manifest disregard" standard).
191 Cf Enkishev, supra note 1, at 100-101 (demonstrating Appellate Arbitration Solution
provides more focused review without violating the Act).
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D. The Artful Draftsnan
Without prejudice to this note's contention that states ought to
extirpate all remaining forms of Expanded Review, the Artful Draftsman
solution allows parties who want review for errors of law or fact to utilize
the mechanism hinted at by the Hall Street Court. 92 The first step for
parties using this solution is to find a state with an arbitration statute
amendable towards Expanded Review and adopt this states scheme in their
arbitration agreement through a "choice-of-law" clause. 9 3 The crucial
second step would be for these parties to expressly indicate that they also
desire this state's arbitration statute to control their arbitration
agreement. 94 Despite the potential attraction of such a solution for those
and eventual
parties who want Expanded Review, only subsequent case law 95
Supreme Court review will determine if this method is viable.
V. CONCLUSION
After thirteen years, divided circuits, and countless commentator
suggestions, the Supreme Court decided against Expanded Review. The
Court utilized a textual interpretation of the Act, a historical examination of
the Act's adoption, and a consideration of the negative implications of
Expanded Review to resolve the split and hold against the doctrine.
In light of this decision, parties contemplating enforcement or
review in federal courts can no longer draft arbitration agreements that
allow for Expanded Review. Still, parties wanting to protect themselves
from a run away award can still utilize the Appellate Arbitration Solution
or the End Around Solution to get more focused award-scrutiny without
running afoul of the Act. Moreover, parties utilizing the Artful Draftsman
solution may avoid the Act altogether and obtain Expanded Review.
The Hall Street decision will help fortify the institutional
framework of the Act and arbitration in the United States. Expanded

192 See supra text accompanying note 169 (demonstrating mechanics of Artful Draftsman
solution).
193 See Hall Street Assocs., 2008 WL 762537, at *8 (suggesting state statutes are potential
source of authority for Expanded Review); supra text accompanying note 169 (demonstrating
parties desiring Expanded Review must first adopt a choice-of-law clause which chooses a state
favorable to Expanded Review).
194 See supra text accompanying note 169 (arguing by also explicitly referencing choice of a
state arbitration statute, parties may provide the intent necessary to activate Expanded Review).
195 See Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, 2008 WL 762537, at *8 (U.S. 2008) (developing
Cryptic Language). Since the Court failed to provide any insight on the efficacy of a scheme like
the Artful Draftsman, its viability remains speculative.
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Review may have eventually led to a paradigm shift in United States
arbitration policy. Given the high stakes involved in commercial disputes,
losing parties with access to Expanded Review clauses would likely have
always attempted a merits review to obtain another "bite at the apple."
Notwithstanding the paucity of contracts with Expanded Review clauses,
without the Hall Street decision, market forces might have made such
clauses standard-form amongst commercial parties.
Yet, the Hall Street decision left one stone unturned. By inserting
the Cryptic Language, the Court left the door on Expanded Review open.
The policy arguments militating against Expanded Review in federal courts
confirming or reviewing arbitration decisions conducted under the Act
apply equally to any court asked to confirm an award. Arbitration
conducted with Expanded Review clauses casts aside the normal
institutional benefits of speed, cost effectiveness, efficiency, and finality in
exchange for a protracted hybrid procedure barely distinguishable from
litigation. A confirming court's task should be streamlined and confined to
a screen for gross procedural errors or evident arbitrator bias. Thus, state
courts and legislatures ought to recognize the wisdom of the Hall Street
Court and eliminate Expanded Review in those jurisdictions which still
sanction the doctrine. Expanded Review is on the run, but the task is left to
states to completely close the door on the doctrine.

Robert 0. Sheridan

